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The range of possible dynamic responses is great. Only a few narrow international commitments limit what states can do.
2 A pro-competition importing state can go after foreign producers who collude in restricting sales in its import market to raise prices. Alternatively, a state might try to open up foreign export markets for its producers. In either case, it may impose sanctions on foreign firms to further its policy. But what happens if the foreign firms act in coordination with, or under the control of, a foreign state? As this question indicates, competing competition policies can lead to international conflict. It is the job of public international law to address such sources of tension. Several general international law doctrines apply to competition law conflicts. None, however, has great clarity or definiteness. There interc onnec ted world . 5 State conse nt simila rly has becom e less impo rtant as coalit ions of intere sted perso ns take shape across state borde rs to formu late and imple ment intern ationa l norm s. 6 These jurist s envisi on a new intern ationa l law that focuse s on huma n intere sts witho ut media tion by states or the territ ory that they occup y or contro l.
7
This vision , howe ver, outstr ips reality . States remai n indisp ensab le to the forma tion of intern ationa l law, and the mapp ing of state autho rity onto state territo ry remai ns centra l to the intern ationa l legal system . Rece nt evide nce of the endur ing impo rtanc e of territo riality can be found in the Intern ation al Cour t of Justic e's decisi on in Jurisd ictiona l Immu nities ~f the State. 8 The Cour t consi dered a claim that the tradit ional immu nity enjoy ed by one sover eign in anoth er's courts must give way when a state is respo nsible for war crime s. The prohi bition of funda menta l norm s of intern ation al law, the argum ent went, rests on a highe r autho rity than state conse nt and thus requir es the suspe nsion of the norm al privil eges that one sover eign accord s anoth er. The Cour t catego rically reject ed this argum ent. It instea d ruled that exceptions to immu nity alway s must rest on conse nt, either expre ss or impli ed by custom . No such excep tion exists for even grave breac hes of that part of internation al law that protec ts indivi dual, rather than state, intere sts.
9
Of cours e, just becau se the Intern ationa l Cour t of Justic e believ es this to be true, it does not make it a fact. Intern ation al law lacks an autho ritativ e arbite r. But it remai ns clear that the signif icance of states and their borde rs still matte rs in the intern ation al system , chang es in the struct ure of intern ational comm unica tion, transp ortati on, and the struct ure of the world econo my notwi thstan ding. What does all this mean for comp etitio n policy ? A wood en applic ation of the princi ples of territo riality and sover eign conse nt would seem to lead to an absolu te prohi bition of any regul ation by a state of condu ct taking place on anoth er sovere ign's territo ry, absen t some agree ment to the contra ry. Indee d, the Unite d States once embra ced this positi on. 10 The Supre me Cour t, howe ver, retho ught the issue long ago. By the 1920s it appro ved sancti ons impo sed on an intern ationa l price-fixing schem e involv ing foreig n partic ipants becau se a key meeti ng of the partic ipants took place in the Unite d States. 11 At the end ofWo rld War II, the gover nmen t argue d that intern ationa l law had evolv ed to the point where a state could regula te extrat errito rial antico mpeti tive condu ct that had a substa ntial, direct , and intent ional effect on the U.S. marke t.
European Court of Justice did effectively the same thing, holding that the European Economic Community then (now the European Union) could regulate a price-fixing conspiracy among foreign producers that used local agents in its implementation.
14 All of these cases involved foreign producers who sought to collect monopoly rents from domestic consumers. When the victims of anticompetitive behavior are foreign consumers, different standards have applied. In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., the Court gave the back of its hand to the argument that the Sherman Act provided a remedy to a plaintiff who sought compensation for its exclusion from the Japanese domestic market. U.S. antitrust laws, the Court declared," do not regulate the competitive conditions of other nations' economies." 15 More recently, the Court in F. Hoffman-La Roche v. Empagran S.A. ruled that the Sherman Act does not apply to anticompetitive conduct that causes only foreign injury. 16 Exceptionally, the Hoffman-La Roche opinion makes much of the customary international law of territoriality, which it invoked to justify its interpretation of the relevant statute. This interpretive tool, the Court argued, "helps the potentially conflicting laws of different nations work together in harmony-a harmony particularly needed in today's highly interdependent commercial world." 17 The last, cryptic signal from the Court on the question of antitrust extraterritoriality is lodged in a footnote in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., a recent pronouncements on the presumption against extraterritoriality in U.S. economic regulation. 18 The case is significant both because it involved securities regulation, an area of great importance to international business, and because it repudiated nearly half a century of lower court practice. In distinguishing its earlier antitrust decisions, the Court noted simply that the Sherman Act applied extraterritorially, without explaining why.
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Taken together, these cases convey a sense of unease, if not confusion. In other regulatory fields, the Court has seized on territoriality as a means of providing a bright line for managing transnational problems. Congress, the Court seems to believe, may manage international regulatory conflicts as it chooses, but it must take the initiative in doing so. Absent explicit legislative action, the default will be a lack of U.S. supervision of foreign transactions, whatever their effect on U.S. interests. 20 But in the field of antitrust, a different baseline applies.
Its dimensions and the reasons for the difference remain murky. Doubtlessly the Justices do not agree among themselves as to these matters. Looking back at the emerging doctrine, one can detect two competing impulses framed by a structural problem. The structural problem is the cryptic language of the Sherman Act, which forbids collusive actions "in restraint of trade or commerce " but provides no clear guidance as to what this means. faced with this challenge, the U.S. courts have taken it upon themselves to develop a common law of fair trade that changes with time and fashion. 21 Unlike (perhaps) other regulatory fields, Congress already has taken the initiative in delegating to the courts the responsibil ity for devising the substantive standards in antitrust.
In developing this common law, the Court has tried to accommod ate two competing insights. On the one hand, in a world of internation al commerce , foreign conspiracie s can impose significant harm on U.S. consumers and presumptively should face regulation. On the other hand, judicial assaults on the choices that foreign states make about the organizatio n of their own markets seem quixotic as well as dangerous. The Court plausibly could insist on further direction from Congress before taking on other countries. A focus not on the location of conduct but rather on the place of harm, to some extent, balances these impulses. If foreign states choose to submit people on their territory to monopoly rents, the case for U.S. courts coming to the rescue of these victims seems especially weak. Thus, territoriali ty comes back in as a constraint on national regulation, only more loosely than other areas. The "place of harm" standard is necessarily more indefinite, and therefore more debatable, than the "place of sale" rule imposed in Morrison.
To be clear, the cases do not explicitly invoke a territorial "place of harm" limit on the Sherman Act. Rather, the courts' behavior and the somewhat confused accounts they give of their conduct seems to fit with such a rule. Thus, one can used territoriali ty to predict judicial behavior, even if the courts themselves talk about the concept obliquely when they do so at all. 22 But this modified use of territoriali ty does not help with one important problem. In many instances, the foreign producers seeking monopoly rents in the United States are arms of a foreign state or otherwise act under state control. Here the economic injury to U.S. consumers results from a direct international conflict based upon opposing state policies. For a court to do nothing would leave the supposed beneficiari es of the Sherman Act without a cause of action. But to allow litigation would put the courts in the position of attacking foreign governmen ts without the clear backing of Congress. If territoriali ty were the only limit on the Sherman Act, then these suits should proceed. Yet, courts understand ably have been queasy about taking on other states directly.
Because territoriali ty offers no help here, the courts have looked to other doctrines to limit litigation against foreign states and their competitio n policies.
International law offers two more doctrines of possible relevance-nam ely, sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine. Each is relevant, even if only the first reflects a clear obligation imposed by international law. 23 
II. Sovereign Immunity as a Limit on Regulation
Historically international law has blended the concepts of exclusive sovereign control over its territory and of sovereign consent by presupposing that sovereign acts performed on another state's territory rest on the host state's permission and that a promise not to hold the acting state responsible in the host state's courts accompanies this permission. Under traditional doctrines of international law, a state that invades another's territory without consent commits an international wrong, for which retaliation up to and including armed attack was permissible. If the state's presence came with consent, by contrast it would be assumed that the host state's consent embraced a promise not to interfere with the acting state's conduct to any greater degree than the acting state had agreed to at the outset. Out of these implied promises arose a doctrine of sovereign immunity, which instructed domestic courts not to exert their authority against a foreign sovereign without the consent of that sovereign or a command of its own state. 24 During the twentieth century, this doctrine evolved. After World War II, the United States took the lead in arguing for an exception to a general rule of immunity in cases where a sovereign mimicked a private actor (acta Jure gestionis), such as by engaging in commercial activity. Congress in 197 6 replaced, as to sovereigns but not government officials, the common law of immunity with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). 25 This statute constitutes U.S. law, but it does not reflect international practice in all respects, and in a few instances, it may even violate international law. 26 Under the FSIA, a foreign sovereign, or a legal entity controlled by a foreign sovereign, enjoys immunity from suit only if it satisfies several requirements. First, in the case of a sovereign-owne d legal entity, the firm must not be formed under U.S. law.
27 Second, it must be directly owned by a foreign state at the time of the suit. 28 Third, the sovereign or entity must not have consented to the suit. 29 Fourth, the suit must not be based on commercial activity that is either carried on in the United States or has a direct effect in the United States. 30 The recent OPEC litigation illustrates how these rules apply to a foreign price-fixing cartel aimed at the U.S. market. 31 U.S. subsidiaries of foreign na-tional oil comp anies (NOC s) enjoy no immu nity becau se they are forme d under U.S. law. The NOC s also are subjec t to suit to the exten t that they are respon sible for the sale of produ cts in the Unite d States , becau se this activity fits withi n the statut ory excep tion for comm ercial activit y. Neith er the states that make up OPEC nor the organ izatio n itself was a name d defen dant, even thoug h the organ izatio n and its state memb ers made up the heart of the conspi racy. From a ration al plaint iff's persp ective ,joinin g OPEC and the memb er states to the litigat ion would have been pointl ess. Both the U.S. subsid iaries and the NOC s were likely to have signif icant attach able assets in the Unite d States . OPEC has no U.S. presen ce, and foreig n states norma lly do not own outrig ht attach able assets in foreig n states. 32 To the exten t that the plainti ffs wante d to make mone y from the litigat ion, the availa ble excep tions to foreig n sovere ign immu nity gave them every thing they could have wante d. The U.S. stance on sovere ign immu nity is not the. only one, of course . Some states, includ ing China , still take the positi on once embra ced by the Unite d States that all state acts have a sovere ign chara cter and thus enjoy immu nity. 33 The Intern ationa l Cour t of Justic e expres sly refuse d to decide wheth er customar y intern ationa l law still embra ces this rule. 34 Even if the old positi on no longe r reflect s the intern ationa l conse nsus, those states that adher e to it may imple ment this all-en compa ssing immu nity withi n their own legal system s. The practi cal conse quenc e of broad er sovere ign immu nity outsid e the Unite d States is limits on enfor cemen t of any judici al award s obtain ed domestic ally. A benef iciary of a U.S. judgm ent would have no ability to reach state-owne d assets (inclu ding the assets of state-owne d compa nies) locate d in jurisd iction s that embra ce the traditi onal appro ach. This adds to the alread y consid erable difficu lty of enforc ing judgm ents agains t foreig n sovere igns. At the end of the day, howev er, sovere ign immu nity is not a signif icant constrain t on the use of comp etitio n law to attack state-organ ized expor t cartels . As a gener al rule, the territo riality princi ple allows states to impos e their own rules on assets invest ed in, as well as transa ctions taking place on, that state's territo ry. This means that retalia tion agains t foreig n cartels works only to the exten t that the foreig n actor has put its peopl e or prope rty at risk in the retaliating state. This funda menta l charac teristi c of the intern ationa l system is as true for privat e cartels as those organ ized by states. 35 But where foreig n actors do enter the U.S. marke t, sovere ign immu nity does nothi ng to preve nt the fullthroat ed applic ation of U.S. comp etitio n rules.
Ill. The Puzzling Persistence of the Act of State Doctrine
Sovereign immunity is not, however, the end of the story. Other doctrines, emanating from, if not strictly required by, international law also allow courts to manage conflicts between cartel-promoting and consumer-protecting states.
In the United States, three overlapping doctrines provide some latitude to courts seeking to avoid confrontations with foreign governments: the act of state doctrine, the foreign sovereign compulsion defense, and the political question doctrine.
The act of state doctrine is, in the United States, one of the more complex and confused bodies of judicially constructed law. It is not a product of international law as such but rather an independent response by some states to problems raised by the territoriality principle. The leading U.S. decision Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino took great pains to state that neither international law nor the Constitution compels the doctrine. 36 Rather, courts apply the doctrine to avoid judicial interference in decisions best made by the political branches. But unlike the political question doctrine, the matters covered by the doctrine are not inherently incapable of judicial resolution. Thus, the courts accept that Congress can override the doctrine and require them to address particular disputes involving foreign sovereign acts.
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Where the act of state doctrine applies, it requires a court to accept the validity of an act of foreign state. Acts by a sovereign of a sovereign nature within its own territory trigger the doctrine. What suffices to override the doctrine, as well as a precise demarcation of its boundaries, remains controversial. But the Supreme Court has passed up at least one opportunity to denounce the doctrine altogether, and the lower courts continue to apply it in a variety of contexts, including antitrust cases. 38 At first blush, the role of the doctrine in antitrust is puzzling. It is, after all, only a default rule that courts may apply in the absence of any clear instruction from the legislature. Act of state issues typically arise in disputes over property rights, including mining and drilling concessions. Lacking constitutional stature, the doctrine cannot survive a contradictory statutory command. The Sherman Act is just such a command, instructing the courts to address anticompetitive behavior affecting U.S. commerce. One might think that the mandate of Congress would supplant whatever discretionary considerations that motivate the doctrine. And the antitrust laws make no distinction between private and foreign-sovereign acts.
An explanation for the persistence of act of state in this field can be found in a feature noted above: The U.S. courts have understood the antitrust laws as effecting a delegation of common-law powers to the judiciary. 39 The legislative instructio n in essence is no instructio n, leaving the judiciary vested with the responsibi lity to grapple with anticompe titive conduct but otherwise without legislative guidance. Congress has neither overridde n common-law doctrines, of which act of state is an example, nor expressly endorsed departures from internationa l practice, the territorial ity principle in particular. The nature of the statutory delegation thus invites reference to a doctrine that, while not applying of its own force, remains useful as an interpretiv e template. 40 By way of compariso n, the Supreme Court has found the act of state doc- for obtaining a governme nt contract through bribery. 41 The Court deemed the relevant question to be whether the payment of a bribe to obtain a governmental favor constitute d fraud under federal law, not whether the bribe invalidated the contract under Nigerian law. 42 According ly, the act of state doctrine did not apply. The revenue rule is the logical counterpa rt of the act of state doctrine.
Just as the doctrine requires a court to accept the validity of a sovereign act undertake n with the sovereign' s territory, the rule requires a court to give no extraterrit orial effect to a sovereign's revenue impost. 43 In Pasquantin o v. United
States, the Court rejected the argument that this common-law rule should illuminate the interpreta tion of"proper ty" for purposes of wire fraud liability. 44 It according ly held that an attempt to evade Canadian customs duties constitute d criminal fraud because Canada's right to duties is a property interest within the meaning of the statute. The Court asserted that the United States had a legitimate interest in criminaliz ing fraud carried out on its own territory, even if the prosecutio n had the collateral effect of strengthen ing the sanctions for evasion of a foreign revenue law. Although the concepts of fraud and property both have their roots in the common law, the Court has not understoo d the criminaliz ation of fraud under federal law as constituti ng a delegation of general lawmakin g power to the judiciary. As a result, common-law doctrines derived from the principle of territorial ity do not have the same role to play in illuminati ng the scope and meaning of the statutes. The Court instead focuses on the purpose of the statute and the reprehens ibility of the conduct involved, not on the effect of criminaliz ation on foreign sovereign acts.Antit rust is different precisely because the fact of the delegation of judicial lawmaking power is so clear, while the extent of this power is so undefined.
Even though antitrust in the United States rests on legislation, the courts legitimately may use the act of state doctrine as an interpretive tool. This basic point, however, does not resolve how the doctrine may function in specific cases. In particular, it leaves open the question of what limitations may constrain it. The Supreme Court has identified three possible exceptions, although it has embraced only two. 45 First, an act of positive law can override the doctrine, including rules of international law based on a high degree of codification or consensus. 46 Second, the Court in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc.
v. Republic of Cuba held that state entities acting entirely within their civil law competence may do things that do not rise to the level of sovereign acts, and thus fall outside the doctrine. 47 Third, a plurality of the Dunhill Court endorsed a commercial exception to the doctrine. 48 In addition, the Court in WS. Kirkpatrick & Co. indicated more generally that the doctrine did not apply when the object of a lawsuit is not to treat a foreign act as a legal nullity but rather to attach adverse consequences to it. 49 Unless and until international law embraces a norm condemning export cartels, either by treaty or by broad consensus constituting a binding customary norm, the first exception cannot apply. The only body of international law that comes close to creating such a norm is the Uruguay Round Agreements, which regulate trade law and arguably address anticompetitive refusals to export. But both U.S. and EU law expressly bar domestic courts from applying these agreements, instead relegating enforcement exclusively to state-to-state dispute resolution. so The Dunhill exceptions, however, have considerably greater purchase. In antitrust cases, courts without exception have rejected the argument that all acts of state-owned entities constitute sovereign acts for purposes of the act of state doctrine. Were the rule otherwise, all activities carried out within the foreign state's territory would enjoy immunity from judicial review, contrary to the clear implication ofFSIA's commercial activity exception. The challenge instead is distinguishing sovereign acts from other behavior. 51 One line of argument focuses on the role of sovereign compulsion. As a formal matter, litigants and courts have treated foreign sovereign compulsion as an analytically distinct issue. 52 As an analytical matter, however, these cases are better seen as applying Dunhill.Actions by foreign firms, whether state-owned or not, that comply with a mandatory rule on the territory of the state that issues the mandate are themselves extensions of the state's sovereign authority.
Attacks on those acts are simply assaults on the exercise of sovereig n power. The compul sion cases thus distingu ish the exercise of civil law rights, to which the doctrine does not apply, from the exercise of sovereig n authorit y.
Anothe r line of cases struggle s with Dunhill' s commer cial exceptio n. In the most recent OPEC litigatio n, the Fifth Circuit ruled that a majorit y of the Suprem e Court had not exclude d commer cial conduc t from the doctrine and therefor e refused to conside r the issue. 53 The Ninth Circuit reached the same outcom e by treating limits on exports of natural resource s as inheren tly noncommer cial. 54 Both decision s have the effect of giving conclus ive effect to sovereign mandate s carried out within the state's territory , even when the mandat e involves commer cial transact ions and results in direct harm to U.S. consum ers. Finally, there remains the general question of whethe r the act of state doctrine has any relevanc e to suits that seek compen sation for the harm caused by a sovereig n act, rather than nullifyin g the act outrigh t. Read broadly, WS. Kirkpatrick & Co. seems to limit the doctrin e only to suits falling into the second category . If so, few if any antitrus t suits ever would raise an act of state issue.
But the WS. Kirkpatr ick opinion is deeply enigmat ic, indicati ng at one point that imposin g tort liability for a wrongfu l detentio n would constitu te the invalidati on of the official act of detentio n. 55 Until the Court revisits the issue, it may be best to treat that case as resting on a narrowe r ground -namel y, the inconsis tency betwee n the doctrin e and the legislati ve purpose of regulati ng the paymen t of bribes to foreign officials . As noted above, the Suprem e Court has yet to conside r whethe r foreign sovereig n compul sion constitu tes a valid excuse for conduc t that otherwi se would be actionab le under the antitrus t laws. 56 A number oflowe r courts have applied the defense in instance s where the compul sion is transpar ent and emanates from governm ent policy makers, as opposed to the manage rs of stateowned enterpri ses. The prevale nce of the defense may indicate that it will endure and ultimate ly gain the endorse ment of the Suprem e Court. Simply as a matter of analytic clarity, howeve r, it does not appear that the foreign sovereig n compul sion defense does any useful work. 57 Compu lsion requires a credible threat, which as a practica l matter involves propose d action or inaction with respect to people or assets on the territory of the threaten ing sovereig n. Anythin g that should count as foreign sovereig n compul sion, accordingly, also would meet the territori al and sovereig n-act compon ents of the act of state doctrine as limited by the Dunhill majority .
In the recent OPEC lawsuit, the Fifth Circuit invoked an alternati ve ground for dismissi ng the compla int, holding that conside ration by a court of a claim that maintenance of the OPEC cartel violated the Sherman Act would violate the political question doctrine. In doing this, the Fifth Circuit embraced the position of the Department of Justice in its amicus brief. On its face, however, the holding seems nonsensical.
The political question doctrine, however murky in detail, rests on a bedrock constitutional principle. Due either to an express constitutional assignment of responsibility or the inherent nature of the judicial process, some issues as a constitutional matter may not be resolved by the courts. 58 The doctrine thus delineates an area where courts lack the capacity to adjudicate. But what does an attack on a government-org anized cartel have to do with judicial incapacity? Is it plausible that, were Congress to adopt a law that expressly extends the Sherman Act to cartels managed by foreign states, the judiciary would refuse on constitutional grounds to carry out this mandate? If the answer is no, then surely the judiciary has the constitutional capacity to do the same under the currently vague standards of that statute. 59 Accordingly, talk about the doctrine seems more of a distraction than useful in international antitrust litigation, notwithstanding the arguments of the government and the occasional inclination of the lower courts to embrace them.
* * *
In a world where optimal global consumer welfare dominated all other policy objectives, competition authorities probably would not distinguish between private and governmental conspiracies in restraint of trade. But in a world where states pursue other objectives and embrace strategic trade objectives, unilateral pursuit of aggressive proconsumer competition objectives invites trade wars rather than cooperation. In some instances, the risk is worth it, because a risk of sanctions may produce market liberalization. In such conflicts, the court may become useful instruments. But rarely do states regard their judiciary as the best place to locate the decision as to when to go to war.
One can imagine a world where the U.S. judiciary, out of an abundance of caution, fully embraced the territoriality principle and insisted that Congress mandate expressly any imposition of antitrust liability on conduct taking place outside the United States. Instead the courts have taken the riskier course of presumptively allowing lawsuits wherever the harm, rather than the conduct, occurs in the United States. But to ameliorate that risk, the courts, not always with a clear doctrinal basis, have withheld action when anticompetitive acts result directly from a transparent command of a foreign state. In such instances, the willingness of the foreign state to take responsibili ty for the anticompet itive conduct relocates the dispute to the sphere of state-to-stat e negotiations . Where negotiation s break down, the legislature still may enlist the courts in the battle, but the courts will not start hostilities on their own. This outcome is conservative in the sense that judicial inaction removes pressure that could goad the governmen t to negotiate internationa l agreements that more closely embrace global consumer welfare. But such conservatism is not necessarily a bad thing. 15. 475 U.S. 574, 582 (1986). In a footnote, the Court clarified that "the Sherman Act does reach conduct outside our borders, but only when the conduct has an effect on American commerce." Id. at 582 n.6. It then cited Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962), a case where foreign and domestic producers colluded in a price-fixing cartel directed at the U.S. market. Nowhere in the opinion did the Court refer to the 1982 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, which seemed to mandate an exclusion from Sherman Act coverage for foreign economic injuries. In a leading case decided not long after Matsushita, a court of appeals ignored this language altogether when considering a challenge to a state policy of limiting the carriage of bulk imported cargo to national
